This article studies the aetiology underlying water management by exploring the social hermeneutics that determined its construction. It details how science, technology and political relations construct each other mutually, both producing and harnessing the scientific discourse on the environment. Supply management continues to prevail, in spite of contradictory claims, through the filiation process linking successive generations of water infrastructure. The case study of the Neste Canal inducing the construction of the Charlas Dam, allows the identification of three types of mechanisms participating in the construction of water deficits that now lead both proponents and opponents of dam construction to harness the environmental discourse. The first lies in the social construction of water science and technology. The second lies in the evolution of power relations among the various actors. The third lies in the insertion of the 'expert' within these power relations.
INTRODUCTION
The overexploitation and degradation of natural resources, especially water, is often attributed to population growth, climate change and inappropriate technology within a theoretical framework that portrays both problem and solution as technical and universal in relevance and application. The 'tragedy of the commons' with its vision of linear development and its ignorance of communal forms of social organisations, still structures the approach of much of the literature devoted to water management 1 . When turning to water, political scientists usually distinguish the scientists who are supposed to provide objective facts concerning it from political actors and activists who struggle to determine its control. This dichotomy is prevalent among French political scientists studying the environment in general. 2 Accounts of water development in France have been structured by this hypothetical dichotomy as authors have portrayed it up to the 1990s as a state led initiative where engineers, structured in corps, elaborated scientific solutions with hardly any interference from non-state actors. Such accounts have portrayed the discourse on public participation in water management as a novelty that arose only in the last twenty years, a time before which non state actors supposedly didn't play a role in this domain. 3 Political ecology emerged as a distinct field in the 1980s in response to the perceived apolitical nature of the mainstream literature on sustainable development 4 . The various approaches that came to be designated under this umbrella label initially focussed on developing world case studies and often emphasized aspects of environmental justice.
Recently, attempts have been made to combine a political ecology approach with that developed by the sociology of scientific knowledge when examining environmental debates.
Such a combined approach focuses on environmental discourses and environmental activism as hybrid objects without supposing 'scientific facts' to provide a pre-established, objective basis for the debate, but rather treating them as social constructs 5 . Forsyth, for example, argues that the political struggles and debates do not occur once the objective facts have been established by the scientists. Both the political struggle and the production of the scientific discourse and technology are deeply enmeshed in one another. These two processes occur concurrently and shape each other 6 .
Forsyth specifically criticized the 'liberation ecology' advocated by Peet and Watts for allowing a projection of values on marginalized actors, often leading to 'solutions' that impoverish them 7 . Wendy Espeland investigated such distortions of the values of local actors pitting capital against water consumers. It dealt with the commodification of water without questioning the power relations embedded in the scientific discourse itself. Much attention was paid to local forms of water management and to the efficiency of communal property regimes 10 .. Many case studies were explored in depth through an actor based approach that sought to highlight how power relations manifest themselves in terms of the physical environment 11 . Yet, very little attention was paid to the social construction of water sciences and water technology within the politics of water management. Most social scientists respected the scientific 'facts' concerning water as an unquestioned evidence, as an objective reality to be accounted with. This was challenged somewhat within a historically limited focus linked to the construction and the impact of the European Water Framework Directive 12 . Yet, minimum flow requirements, water quality indicators, biodiversity, sewage systems deserve more attention from this perspective. Why do we follow such requirements or indicators? Why do we resort to such technologies rather than to others? They may presently be put forward as neutral tools by those who promote them. Yet they systematically embody past compromises, past prioritisations that advantaged some actors over others and privileged some methods over others.
The lack of attention paid to the construction of the dominant water management narrative stems partly from the extraordinary difficulty involved in untangling the various mechanisms that produced it. The depth provided by a historical analysis over several centuries is priceless as it allows us to reconstruct the successive wars of position that led to paradigmatic reformulations of water management over time. Investigating infrastructure and its uses while harnessing historical methods to unravel the discursive constructions and the power relations Creating a water supply in the nineteenth century led to the construction of a water deficit in the twenty-first century. The advent of a 28 km long canal, with an initial flow of 2 cubic meters a second eventually generated the need for a 110 million cubic meters reservoir.
Exploring the filiation of this infrastructure sheds light on the subtle manner supply management generates an ever increasing demand for water. These mechanisms lie in the paradigmatic formulation of the management issues. They stem from a discursive process deeply embedded in power relations. This article first explores the mechanisms that led to the construction of the Neste Canal in 1862. It then details the evolution of its insertion in the The use of the Neste Canal evolved over the last century, arguably, according to the actors who implemented these changes, on the basis of a productive logic. Archives and interviews of such actors allow the analysis of their narratives. This article locates their decisions and their positions within the social and political constellation in which they were functioning. This avoids writing a Whig history of the infrastructure, i.e. accounting for the past from the perspective of the present and portraying the successive constructions as technical solutions to objective needs. This approach allows us to identify three types of mechanisms participating in the construction of a water deficit now deemed to justify the construction of the Charlas dam. The first type of mechanism lies in the social construction of water science and technology. The second lies in the evolution of power relations among the state and other actors. The third lies in the insertion of the 'expert' within these power relations. These three types of mechanisms do not constitute an exhaustive list, but they provide an insight in the manner infrastructure seems to procreate independently from the users' and builders' will. They allow us to identify the successive paradigmatic shifts that now allow both the proponents and the opponents of dam construction to harness the environmental discourse. While they systematically put forward arguments pertaining to a productive logic such as improving trade, agricultural production or environmental protection, their strategies were largely determined by a variety of other stakes. These are examined in the following section.
The power struggles that determined the outcome of every decision along this path contributed to the changing relations among the various actors. These are analysed in the next section. These struggles also participated in the determination of what was expert knowledge and who was an expert. More crucially, they contributed to shaping the insertion of the "experts" within decision making mechanisms. This is analysed in the last section
The social construction of water science and technology
Science and technology are a political and social construct. Theories and techniques never become dominant because they were objectively the most logical or the most accurate. They rise to hegemonic status when the social groups that promote them become dominant 19 . Any understanding of the 'development of water' must entail the exploration of the mechanisms whereby water sciences, technologies and management were constructed. The history of the Neste Canal reveals the links between the original rationale for the construction of the canal, the development of irrigation, the sudden increase in maize production, the development of the minimum flow requirement as the crucial environmental indicator, and the present construction of the inevitability of the Charlas dam. The social and political struggles over each of these issues led to a series of paradigmatic reframing that eventually showed the construction of a dam as the only solution to cater for a derived demand for water. In other words, science and technology were largely constructed by social and political power
relations. Yet, conversely, the present scientific discourse and technology largely limits the power struggles that can now take place. The navigability of the Garonne River, supposedly an objective, neutral measurement of a technological possibility, was highly disputed between Moissac, Montauban and Toulouse for commercial reasons. The 'blackboxing' of a scientific claim refers to the collective process that transforms it into an unquestioned scientific fact 24 . The 'blackboxing' of the Garonne's navigability was a harsh struggle that extended over several decades. It officially pitted statistics and scientific observations against each other. But these were formulated to suit the interests of specific parties 25 . The CCT lost a first round as the Conseil d'Etat approved the construction of the lateral canal in 1832. But it won in the long term when it succeeded in obtaining that this canal be only a class 2 canal.
The origins of the
The struggle to avoid the construction of the canal to Moissac was enmeshed with a concurrent one to "complete the Canal of the Two Seas". Riquet's initial idea was to link the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. The CCT championed extending the Canal du Midi from Toulouse to Bayonne. In its 1808 meeting with Emperor Napoleon, this was its only request. Portraying that stretch of land as extremely fertile, they told Napoleon that "This canal would create men and wealth that will never exist without it, the imperial navy could benefit from the best masts and the best construction wood…" 26 They expected a cost of 20 millions 'only' which triggered Napoleon's enquiry whether the revenue of the canal would amount to 300000 franks. The members of the Chambre de Commerce answered an unambiguous "yes", but took care to mention in their record of this meeting that the canal would bring about an increase in the activities that would eventually allow the generation of 27 The Préfet had been unable to locate the documents.
28
The systematic reference to a Canal of the Two Seas instead of to a Toulouse Bayonne Canal is part of a construction of inevitability that is essential for the advent of any infrastructure 29 .
In this case, it portrays the Canal du Midi as an incomplete project. The CCT systematically cultivated the memory of Riquet to recall its version of his initial goal. It achieved this in a variety of ways such as the ceremony it held to mark the reception of Riquet's medal on 29
April 1827 30 .
Once Galabert, a free lance, seat of the pants engineer who was neither a member of the state corps or a graduate of a civil engineering school, published in 1830 the project of a canal that would take its source in the Neste, carry water both along the Pyrénées up to the Bec du Gave, near Bayonne, and to Toulouse, the CCT became his keenest ally. It wrote to the Minister of
Interior that this canal would create immense wealth, noting that "via easy irrigation, arid plains would be transformed into fresh and rich meadows, the product of which are less sensitive than others to the vagrancies of the climate." 31 . When Galabert, who had by then managed to be elected as deputy of the Gers, informed the CCT of the Conseil d'Etat's decision to approve the lateral canal, the CCT sent him 600 copies of its 1831 mémoire to distribute to the legislative assembly, and rallied many other chambers of commerce to its efforts. Clear alliances emerged between actors pursuing very different goals, but sharing an interest in a specific definition of the Garonne's navigability and in the construction of a canal from Toulouse to Bayonne 32, . These alliances allowed a specific "scientific" discourse to prevail concerning these issues.
Galabert died in 1841, ruined by his ambitious, failed project. So when the CCT examined
Montet's project of a Neste canal the same year, it perceived it as a partial fulfilment of Galabert's project, a subsidized first section of the canal to Bayonne. In his report on this new project, Arnoux notes "If Galabert's canal was to be executed in its entirety by speculators, the navigation tax would be sizeable, these taxes would be based on the importance of the capital invested in its construction; the taxes would need to cover the interest payments of that capital, but would also need to cover the maintenance and the operation costs. The portion that the government will build cannot cause an expensive tax because the State must not speculate." 33 The Chambre de Commerce perceives this project as a subsidized first section of 34 . It practiced a tarification for navigation on these channels that was competitive with rail transport. The CCT fought this tarification for decades, arguing that the low added value of the area's products, maize and timber essentially, meant that this high transport cost was prohibitive to their exportation 35 .
Improving navigation on the Baïse, where no tariff could be exercised because it was a natural water course became even more attractive to the CCT. The Neste Canal was thus not only a first step in the realisation of the Toulouse-Bayonne Canal, it was also useful in the short-term because it could supply the Baise river system with a permanent flow of water that would allow navigation and therefore avoid the unacceptable tariffs levied on the canals.
While the proponents of the Neste Canal were only concerned with navigation, they harnessed irrigation to further their cause. "Over one hundred thousand hectares of land desiccated by the rays of a scorching sun will receive the fertilizing water of the Garonne. This water, carried to the top of hills, will transform our arid plains into rich pastures. Then, butcher's meat, the expense of which presently deprives the labouring class from a food so necessary to the sustenance of physical forces, will certainly decrease in price. Cattle, that is lacking to the work of the ploughman, will multiply in the great properties…" 36 . Author 
Maize in the South West of France
Introduced in the South West of France from Spain in the 15 th century, maize long appeared as a suspicious plant reserved for animal feed because of its reputation for spreading diseases.
Yet, more resistant than other crops, it could feed humans in time of crisis. 38 At the time when the Chambre de Commerce de Toulouse strives actively to obtain a navigation canal to Bayonne, it also successively reports excess of maize for which no demand exists in France.
In 1803, it asks permission from the Ministry of Interior to sell this maize in Spain and Corsica, explaining that the crop was very good but no one in France wants to buy such a product, so maize "rots" in the granaries. 39 It renews such a request a year later for identical reasons.
40
The overall improvement in productivity in agriculture throughout the nineteenth century reduced the importance of maize as the 'insurance policy' in case other crops failed. Its
Author producing species that would be stable and distinct in order to allow anti-fraud control and an intellectual property regime, producing homogeneous species to allow for mechanisation and producing species that reacted well to fertilisers and pesticides. 44 A public establishment, the INRA worked hand in hand with private seed suppliers and with activist movements such as the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique, represented in the Centre National des Jeunes Agricultueurs (CNJA), an influential group within the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), in order to change the identity of the French peasantry so it would perceive itself as belonging to a technical profession. This was part and parcel of the Gaullist effort to modernise agriculture and free manpower to enter industry and the services.
It was necessary to persuade farmers to adopt hybrid maize they didn't want. It also had unforeseen consequences on the balance of power between state and professional organizations which will be explored in the second part of this article. It eventually empowered farmer associations such as the AGPM.
Author-produced version of the article published in Environment and History, 2010, 16(1), 97-123. The original publication is available at http://www.erica.demon.co.uk/EH/EH1604.html doi: 10.3197/096734010X485319
After coercing and persuading French farmers to cultivate new crops such as hybrid maize, the French state persuaded them to irrigate to improve productivity. The discourse, elaborated since the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to which irrigation would enrich the area, had become unquestioned by the 1950s, even though it had only been produced as a justification to attain other goals.
The massive cultivation of maize in the South West of France induced a derived demand for water, i.e one in which the need for a factor in production derives from the need for the final product this factor helps to produce. The focus was placed on the demand for water without questioning the construction of the demand for the product this water was producing. When irrigating maize was criticised at the beginning of the 21 st century, the soaring oil prices spurred a new discourse. Biofuel produced from maize would contribute to curb global warming.
The advent of the minimum flow requirement
The concept of a minimum flow requirement, now blackboxed, plays a crucial role in the filiation process linking the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam. Initially an anthropocentric idea, the minimum flow requirement eventually became the crucial environmental indicator harnessed to justify constructing the dam.
Montet's project detailed an anthropocentric definition of the minimum flow requirement 45 .
Only those waters of the Neste that are superfluous to the present and future needs of its shores are to be deviated 46 . These needs clearly did not include the environment. Yet, this minimum flow requirement was eventually going to become the pivotal environmental indicator for water courses. Over the next century and a half, it was to acquire an ecocentric character absent from its initial formulation. The Water Management Master Scheme officially adopted by the Adour-Garonne Basin in 1996 for a period of validity lasting until 2009, adopted the following definition 'The minimum flow requirement is the flow value determined by the Water Management Master Scheme:
-above which the normal co-existence of all uses and the healthy function of the aquatic environment are guaranteed, -which must thus be guaranteed every year during the low water period, with tolerances defined in table c1'
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The construction of water indicators shows three phases. The identification of a characteristic is first generated by the use of the resource 48 . In the Neste case, the capacity of a watercourse to allow navigation was defined in 1841 as the most important characteristic; ie its flow. As
the watercourses of the plateau were intermittent, the second phase of the construction of the indicator, the measurement of that property, could only consist of setting an artificial target to be reached thanks to infrastructure that would alter the natural flow. This occurred because a set of actors with specific interests were producing these definitions. Finally, the third phase of indicator construction, the transformation of this measured property into a variable within a model, was achieved by those who managed the infrastructure. Once an indicator is established within a predominant discourse, its users forget the specific options that generated it in the first place 49 . This certainly was the fate of the minimum flow requirement in the river system fed by the Neste Canal. France is a stark illustration of this as was detailed in the first section of this article.
The evolution of power relations among the state and other actors
The weakness of post-colonial states probably eased the identification of such actor struggles within natural resources management in the developing world. Migdal detailed the complex compromises developing states had to reach with the many actors exercising social control within their borders 54 . The study of the interaction between such power relations within human societies and the environment eventually came to be recognized as political ecology 55 .
This approach focussed on deciphering the power struggles and their accompanying discursive constructions in order to shed light on the manner societies interacted with their environment 56 . Significantly, such approaches were initially only used to study developing states 57 . In Europe, the Weberian hypothesis largely prevailed and prevented inductive approaches rooted in field observations, interviews and archival work such as is presented in the first section of this article. Instead, a deductive approach privileged the study of water laws and portrayed public policies largely as top down developments 58 .
Regionalism and decentralisation were often shown as succeeding a period of state dominance and the regal character of the French administration was shown as an impediment to the "concertation" mechanisms it was attempting to deploy 59 . Yet, the theoretical body produced by studies of cases in developing countries proves very useful to understand the Neste situation.
The nineteenth century saw a fierce battle pitting the engineers of the Ponts et Chaussées and independent entrepreneurs such as Galabert to secure a monopoly over large infrastructure projects. When the author of the corps' report on the Neste Canal project recalls all of the Ingénieurs en chef who, before Galabert, offered another path for the channel, he is constructing the inevitability of both his own project and his corps securing that monopoly 60 .
The state limited riparian rights in 1919 and instituted a regime of concession or authorization for producing hydroelectricity. The state was thus reacting to private hydropower development and was trying to gain control over it.
Dams were built in the Pyrénées at the end of the nineteenth century, upstream from the Neste, affecting the supply of the Neste Canal. Once irrigation developed, the schedule of water release became crucial. Irrigating farmers didn't usually need water at the times most appropriate for electricity generation. In 1957, Electricité de France (EDF), the national electric company, negotiated schedules of water releases for the Neste system with the Ministry of Agriculture. Once created, the CACG took over this negotiation role. In 1960, the state granted the CACG a concession on a series of dams and irrigation perimeters it was due to build. In 1963, the state allocated the CACG 48 million cubic meters of water at will from EDF dams, to distribute free of charge. Between 1972 and 1991, The CACG started selling water to cover its high fixed costs. It gains from selling ever more water to the farmers and would face bankruptcy if the sales dropped excessively. The state had initially created the CACG as its instrument, but by 1991, it had become a relatively independent actor with its own stakes and strategies concerning water management in the Neste system. It had forged The Neste Canal has existed within a hydropolitical constellation that includes a vast array of actors deploying strategies over very different scalar levels. These actors evolved over time.
New ones appeared and others lost their power. But at no time, was the state a monolithic or monopolistic actor determining the fate of water management. The changing power relations among these actors determined the construction of the management objectives. Initially, water was carried to allow navigation and civilizing 'backward' areas. This objective changed into growing maize to export and generate foreign currency. Later, water had to be supplied so that the CACG could remain in business. Now, it is being channelled so that biofuels will curb global warming. The changing power relations largely determined the place environment occupied within these decisions, the manner problems were perceived and technical solutions conceived. Throughout, laws and decrees issued by the state appeared reactively, as tools of the state, never as driving forces bringing about fundamental change.
The Insertion of the Expert within decision making processes
Throughout the filiation process whereby the Neste Canal spawned the Charlas Dam, "expert knowledge" played a significant role. Few individuals were recognized to have the capacity to define either public interest, the navigability of the Garonne, a correct indicator for environmental health, the best technological choices, the most efficient agricultural practices, or the most appropriate crops. Those who benefited from such recognition will be referred to here as "the experts". The first section of this article showed how these issues were shaped by numerous power struggles enmeshed with each other over various scales. The second section detailed how new actors emerged on the scene as time went by and how the power relations among them evolved. Each actor tried to identify "its" experts to put forward a rational and scientific case in line with its own strategy. The mechanisms whereby experts are embedded within these power relations and these decision making mechanisms is worth examining. It power is granted to the experts, who pays them, which formal and informal networks they belong to, such as, in France, the alumni associations of the "higher schools", the corps, all contribute to determine the mechanisms whereby experts are embedded within power relations and decision making within this process.
The advent of modernity has been described as a specific alliance between the "experts" and the state apparatus that emerged between the 17 th and 19 th century in Western Europe when the ruling class progressively changed its role. "Nothing less was required than the acceptance of state expertise in the art of living; it had to be admitted that the state and the specialists it appointed and legitimized knew better what was good for the subjects, and how they should live their lives and beware of acting in a fashion harmful to themselves. The subjects were not only denied the ability to find their way to God; they were denied the capacity of living human life without the surveillance, assistance and corrective intervention of those in the know." 61 . This power knowledge syndrome constitutes the most conspicuous aspect of modernity.
By the time Napoléon broke openly with the "ideologists" in 1812, the major engineering exist, in which the intellectual role is performed 63 . This is shaping both the experts' knowledge and their means to transmit this knowledge as valid. This is participating in the filiation process linking the Neste Canal and the Charlas Dam because it is contributing to the labelling of knowledge as valid and to its being articulated within infrastructure decisions.
The experts are not necessarily produced within the "Higher Schools", however. While the state used the CCT throughout the nineteenth century as a reservoir of experts on economic issues, it only used the Société d'agriculture as a tool to civilise the backward peasants of the area. The study published in 1891 by the CCT specifies outright the claim to legitimacy of its author: he has, it claims, the practical sense of a merchant who knows how to draw on his own professional experience in order to establish, through rational deductions, an excellent defence of public interest 64 . Legitimizing knowledge by invoking its being grounded in rationality is typical of modernity. Yet, this statement reveals the social hermeneutics at work because it links the attribution of rationality to the social status of the author: a successful merchant, i.e a member of the notability. 
